Colored People's Organization was established; it was later renamed the Colored People's Congress (CPC). The CPC soon came under the control of the SACP through leaders like Reginald September. In October of the same year, the Congress of Democrats (COD) was established, led by Bram Fischer (who would later serve as chairman of the SACP), Joe and Ruth Slovo, and Leonel Bernstein. Finally, in March 1955, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was founded; it soon affiliated with the Moscow-dominated World Conference of Trade Unions, and was controlled from its inception by SACP cadres like Stephen Dhlamini, Vuyisile Mini (hanged for MK terrorism in 1964), and Leon and Norman Levy. SACTU was led from the outset by Black Communists Moses Mabhida (later a SACP president) and Dhlamini, but unlike the other front organizations, it openly claimed multiracial membership. That at least SAIC, CPC, and SACTU were party fronts was implicitly admitted by *The African Communist* years later, when it quoted from a statement by the SACP Central Committee that, following the founding of the MK in December 1961, "*it was decided that the SAIC, CPC and SACTU should not do anything to jeopardize their legality by an open commitment to armed struggle.*"[18]

The failure of the Defiance Campaign to change the situation of Blacks in South Africa pushed some former ANCYL leaders further left. In 1953, with financial support from COD, a delegation including Sisulu and Nokwe visited Eastern Europe and the USSR. That visit, and the clear dependence of the ANC radicals upon the COD and "former" Communists in their own ranks for financial and organizational support, signaled the beginning of the end of the ANC's already shaky organizational independence.

Other events, too, helped to destroy the ANC's original identity and drive genuine "Africanists" from its ranks. The foremost of these factors was, ironically, the 1952 election of Chief Albert Luthuli as ANC president. A true pacifist, Luthuli was the closest any ANC leader has ever been to a Martin Luther King. Through sheer charisma, Luthuli might conceivably have maintained some balance between his own pacifism and the more aggressive tactics of a Sisulu or Mandela, and between the competing Communist and Africanist undercurrents in the ANC. Unfortunately, however, he was banned to rural Natal almost from the start by the Nationalist government. Communists and radicals in the ANC ranks refused to move the organization's headquarters from Johannesburg (where they controlled the Transvaal branch) to Durban, only 48 miles away from Luthuli's place of banishment. The result was that Luthuli was never more than a figurehead for the ANC, poorly or never informed of decisions taken in his name and out of touch with the developments within the organization.[19]



Albert Luthuli, elected president of the African National Congress in the 1952.

—Camera Press.

Taking maximum advantage of the precedent established by the ANCYL in 1952 of allowing equal participation of non-ANC groups in the planning of the Defiance Campaign, the CPSA remnants successfully pushed for the establishment in 1955 of the Congress Alliance, which included the ANC (by then effectively led by Walter Sisulu, due to Luthuli's banning), SAIC, COD, CPC, and SACTU. The formation of the Alliance meant the combination of an already heavily Communist-infiltrated organization (the ANC) with four Communists fronts, all having equal standing in the coordinating committees of the umbrella organization.[20]

[18] "The Enemy Hidden under the Same Colour," Statement of the CC of the SACP, in *African Communist*, No. 65, 2nd quarter 1975, loc. cit. (emphasis in original text).

[19] Ngubane, op. cit., pp. 583-85, and Campbell, op. cit., p. 47.

[20] See Gibson, op. cit., p. 51, and Campbell, op. cit., p. 46.

The same organizational principle governed membership on the committee formed to draft a "Freedom Charter" for the Alliance, a document that till this day remains the fundamental statement of the ANC outlook. Drafting of the Charter was undertaken very "discreetly," (even though all Alliance member organizations were legal at the time), and Luthuli himself did not even see the text until after it was publicly adopted.[21] A majority of the drafting committee was non-Black or non-ANC; the most prominent of the drafters were Bernstein and Joe Slovo of the COD, Dadoo, Tloome, and Dhlamini—people for whom strictly African affairs were less vital than were ideological and internationalist considerations. This may explain the fact noted by observers on both the left and right that the Freedom Charter had a strong "European" flavor. Indeed, the language was a departure from traditional ANC concerns with political representation and economic opportunity for Blacks, but was similar to communist documents elsewhere. The document did not even mention the principles of "one man, one vote," Pan Africanism, or African decolonization. Such concerns were only to become part of the standard ANC language a few years later.[22]

The tactics evident in the drafting of the Charter were also observable in the procedures utilized to achieve adoption of the Charter at a "Congress of the People," held at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, June 25-26, 1955. Luthuli, the ANC president, was neither present, nor consulted; some 1,000 of the 3,000 participants were non-Black,[23] and one may assume that the bulk of the Blacks who attended were from SACTU. There was no debate, and the Charter was "approved" by acclamation. Moreover, when in April 1956, the document was submitted for ratification by the ANC as an official document, the Charter's supporters ensured its ratification by packing the meeting hall with non-ANC members, who were allowed to vote. As a participant described matters:

The check on members was only done during the Sunday afternoon session. The Charter had been adopted on Saturday evening. Everybody present in the hall participated in the voting. It was impossible to distinguish members from non-members of the African National Congress.[24]

With the formation of the Congress Alliance and the tactics used for the drafting, adoption, and ratification of the Freedom Charter, the ANC permanently lost its political innocence. It in effect adopted the ideas and tactics of its members from the former CPSA. This process, which was consummated in the period 1953-56 and clearly—at least in retrospect—was part of a carefully planned strategy on the part of the CPSA remnants, alienated many of the young Black nationalists in the ANC ranks, most of whom left in 1959 to found the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

The banning of the ANC itself in 1960 only helped to consolidate the transformation of the organization. While retaining its venerable name, the ANC had for all practical purposes become, and remains to this day, a Leninist organization in its internal structure, a Marxist one in its political goals, and an ally of the USSR in its geopolitical aims. Let us now examine each of these attributes in more current detail.

The Structure of the ANC

The ANC today comprises three components: (1) a sophisticated system of successive concentric layers of legal fronts and/or sympathetic organizations and a separate, independent and highly compartmentalized, if small, MK infrastructure inside South Africa; (2) a tightly-knit external organization, based in Lusaka, Zambia, which reflects in its composition the overlapping of the SACP and the Congress Alliance of the mid-1950's; and (3) the MK, the overwhelming majority of which is based in Angolan camps, with small numbers of operatives within South Africa. Although the putative apex of all these elements is the National Conference, in fact, the apex is the National Executive Committee with its 30 members, and, above it, the Revolutionary Council (since its 1983 "disbandment" known as the politico-military committee).[25] The NEC and Revolutionary constitute a largely self-perpetuating group within the ANC with exclusive decision-making power.

[21] See Campbell, op. cit., p. 47. This is in line with the general treatment of Luthuli by his ANC "subordinates"—Moses Kotane actually only informed Luthuli at the last moment that the latter was also supposed to go to Bandung on the ANC delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference of April 1955. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 164. The banning of Luthuli was applied and lifted sporadically throughout the last 15 years of his life.

[22] For a text of the Freedom Charter, see Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, Eds., *The African Liberation Reader*. London: Zed Press, 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 81-84.

[23] Gibson, op. cit., p. 53. According to this account, Dr. Wilson Conco, Luthuli's deputy in the ANC, presided over the Kliptown meeting where the ANC ratified the Charter, but afterwards he admitted that he had first seen the document only at the meeting; in addition, Luthuli never knew who drafted it.

[24] Peter Tsele, in *Bantu World*, Apr. 28, 1956, cited in Edward Feit, *South Africa, the Dynamics of the African National Congress*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 17.

[25] Alfred Nzo has characterized the Revolutionary Council as "the helm of the politico-military wing of our movement"; not coincidentally, Dadoo (whose nickname among friends was Moss) was vice-chairman of that

African National Congress (ANC) leader Oliver Tambo (left) and South African Communist Party leader and long-time ANC activist Joe Slovo pictured on October 29, 1986, in Maputo at the funeral of Mozambican President Samora Machel.

—Reuters Bettmann Newsphotos

The National Conference has been convened only three times since the banning of the ANC in 1960—at Lobatse, Botswana, in 1962; at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969; and at Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. An SACP account of the Morogoro gathering sheds particularly clear light on the authoritarian nature of ANC decision-making. At that conference, the non-African members admitted to the ANC at the time were appointed by the ANC executive and were "neither singly nor collectively consulted on the composition of the new executive." Indeed, the NEC had previously mandated acting President-General Tambo "assisted" by SACP stalwarts Kotane and Marks, to reconstitute the executive (selections that were ratified pro forma by the conference).[24]

By the time of the Kabwe conference, rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the secretive and "democratic centralist" authoritarian nature of ANC decision-making forced some modest concessions. It was decided that national conferences should be held at least once every five years.[27] In addition, a slightly more "democratic" face was shown by the naming of a list of 40 candidates to fill the 30 slots on an expanded NEC. Still, all candidates were hand-picked by the NEC, and the voting procedure was equally telling: delegates voted by blocs rather than individually. These blocs included groups that had been part of the Congress Alliance (SAIC, SACTU, CPC, SACP, COD); the MK; the ANCYL; the Angola-based party school (under MK leadership); the

body from the start until his death in 1963. See Alfred Nzo, "Mota Our Example," speech on the occasion of Dadoo's 70th birthday, in Sechaba, November 1979, p. 17.

The Revolutionary Council was "dismantled" as a show of democratization, but the decision was taken without the formality of a National Conference, which had not been held for 14 years.

[24]"The Enemy Hidden under the Same Colour," p. 30.

[27]Tom Lodge, "The African National Congress: Kabwe and After," The South African Institute of International Affairs, *International Affairs Bulletin* (Braamfontein), No. 2, 1986, p. 8.

Angola-based training camps (also under the MK); the Lusaka headquarters officials; the women's league; and representatives of the South African domestic front —presumably the United Democratic Front (see below).[28] The built-in advantage for SACP-controlled groups is evident.

The NEC, the Revolutionary Council (or successor politico-military commission), and the command-and-control hierarchy of the MK all constitute the decision-making structure of the ANC External Mission, headquartered in Lusaka. The leaders in Lusaka consist of persons who have lived outside South Africa since at least 1977, many of them since the early 1960's. Actual decisions are taken by a restricted, largely self-perpetuating group within the NEC, which includes two types of leaders: chiefs of major departments and the largely autonomous MK leadership.

The NEC has a number of subordinate departments, which vary in importance according to their role as well as to their leader's overall standing within the ANC leadership. Johnny Makhatini, officially the head of the International Department, is probably less influential than Francis Meli, the editor of *Sechaba*, at least in part because the former is a Zulu within an organization whose Black leaders are now overwhelmingly Xhosa.[29] The head of the Information and Propaganda Department, Thabo Mbeki, some of whose duties overlap with those of Makhatini's, is far more influential—both because of the natural importance of his task for an exile organization and because of his personal charisma and the appeal of his name (his father, an old SACP hand, has shared the same prisons with Nelson Mandela since the early 1960's). The heads of the Administration (Simon Makana), Education (Henry Makgothi), Research (Dr. Pallo Jordan), Youth (Joe Nhlanhla), and Women (Gertrude Shope) departments enjoy various degrees of influence largely due to their personal ties with top leaders like Tambo, Nzo, Modise, and Maharaj, rather than as a result of their function. A very important (and misleadingly labelled) "department" is that of Internal Reconstruction and Development, led by Maharaj. This department is in fact the internal intelligence and counter-intelligence body of the ANC, tasked with preventing infiltration and enforcing internal discipline and control over the rank and file. Equally important, Maharaj is also responsible for control over and coordination with legal ANC fronts inside South Africa, such as the United Democratic Front (see below).[30]

Although the Congress Alliance rubric disappeared in the 1960's,[31] the ANC remains an umbrella organization under which the Alliance's former "components" are still quite influential. The ANCYL is a department, and leaders of the CPC, SAIC, SACP, and SACTU remain prominent under various guises, particularly within the MK. September is in charge of internal discipline and counter-intelligence of the MK, Slovo of the SACP was (until 1987) MK chief of staff and responsible for its urban operations, SACTU's John Nkadimeng and Dhlamini maintain links with the legal trade unions inside South Africa, and the CPC's James Stuart appears to be the MK's ideological chief. Joe Modise, a former colleague of Mandela in the ANCYL, is commander of the MK and in direct charge of its rural operations, while Chris Hani, a "veteran" of the 1976 Soweto riots, is the political commissar. Hani, Modise, Slovo, Maharaj (and possibly Stuart), as well as Tambo, Nzo, and possibly a few others form the politico-military commission linking the ANC and the MK under the strictly nominal chairmanship of Tambo.[32]

ANC Activities Abroad

The vital activities of the ANC take place mostly outside of South Africa. They include propaganda/diplomacy, fundraising, and military and cadres training. The most prominent individual player in these activities is ANC President Oliver Tambo, a tireless world traveler. Tambo works both to isolate the Pretoria government in world opinion and to delegitimate the ANC's anti-apartheid rivals within South Africa, such as Chief Mangosuthu Gatcha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement among the Zulus, Bishop Isaac Mokoena's United Christian Conciliation Party, liberal white opposition groups, and independent Indian and Colored organizations. The ANC attitude toward the Pan African Congress is rather ambiguous. From time to time, some ANC leaders attack the PAC for its racist outlook, but as a rule, the ANC does not even mention its rival; on occasion—outside of South Africa—the ANC offers the PAC cooperation and

[28] *Africa Confidential* (London), Dec. 10, 1986, p. 2.

[29] Young and educated Xhosas have largely replaced the older, often Zulu leaders of the ANC. Rapid industrialization since the 1950's brought far larger numbers of Xhosas than Zulus to the urban areas, which are the major areas of support for the ANC. The development and growth of Inkatha during the 1970's provided most Zulus with an alternative to the ANC and further reduced the role of Zulus in it.

[30] On the ANC departments and leaders, see, e.g., "South Africa: The ANC," in *Africa Confidential*, Dec. 10, 1986, pp. 1–4, and *Talking with the ANC*.

[31] The Congress became practically defunct when its major component, the ANC, was banned in 1960.

[32] See fn. 30 supra. That the (Black) Tambo is not altogether master of his own house was suggested by Modise's call for anti-white attacks at the very time that Tambo was in the United States. See *The Sunday Mail* (Harare), June 22, 1986.

At left, African National Congress President Oliver Tambo with US Black leader Jesse Jackson in London on November 3, 1985, for a march sponsored by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement seeking full sanctions against South Africa for failure to grant independence to Namibia and dismantle apartheid; at right, Tambo with Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on November 4, 1986.

—Telegram and TASS from Sovfoto.

fair competition for the allegiance of the people of South Africa. Inside the country, however, the competition between the fronts and their sympathizers is fierce, public, and occasionally violent.

The main centers of the ANC's propaganda/diplomatic efforts are London, New York, Moscow, East Berlin, Lusaka, and New Delhi. The oldest and most active of these is the London mission, set up following the banning of the CPSA in 1950 and greatly strengthened after the outlawing of the ANC itself in April 1960. Both *Sechaba* and *The African Communist* were initially published there (although they are now printed in East Berlin), and the London office has also been an important conduit for funds from Western sympathizers. Members of this office have become members of the NEC—most notably former office chiefs Aziz Pahad and Reginald September. It is interesting to note that from the outset, the majority of the staff has been non-Black.[33]

The ANC offices in New Delhi have usually been led by a member of SAIC, and have traditionally served as a link with the Non-Aligned Movement. Most of the ANC activities in the United States are undertaken at the United Nations or at least under the nominal leadership of the organization's mission there, formally led by Johnny Makhatini's office. ANC leaders and spokesmen have been free to travel in the US and even to use US platforms to advocate the murder of political rivals back in South Africa.[34]

The ANC and its auxiliary organizations maintain open ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with its major party or front organizations—*The World Marxist Review*, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Peace Congress, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the International Union of Students, the International Organization of Journalists, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Most members of the NEC are also members of at least one of these Soviet international front organizations.

Links with the Soviet bloc ensure ANC funding, military supplies, training, and world-wide propaganda resources. The importance of these ANC-Soviet ties was highlighted recently by Tambo when he stated that the Soviet-bloc countries:

[33]This reflects the overwhelming preponderance of non-Blacks among former South Africans living in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the SACP has long had intimate ties with the British and the Irish communist parties. E.g., Francis X. Clines, in "Communists Claim Comradeship with Rebels," *The New York Times*, Aug. 1, 1986, mentions the joint participation of the SACP's Slovo; Gordon McLennan, General Secretary of the Communist Party Great Britain; and James Stewart, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland at the SACP's 65th anniversary.

Among the essential players in establishment of the London office of the ANC were Maharaj, himself a former member and leader of the British party, and September.

[34]Appearing on a California campus on October 10, 1985, ANC spokesman Aboi Molo, speaking about "collaborators" with the movement's enemies, stated: "You have to eliminate one to save hundreds . . ." At the same gathering ANC spokesman Tim Ngubane stated: "We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of it [i.e., being one]." See Campbell, op. cit., p. 35.

have shown themselves to be allies we can always rely upon, a ***secure rear base*** *without which our struggle would be even more difficult and protracted . . . . As a movement, we need to . . . protect our friendship and cooperation with the socialist community of nations very jealously.*[35]

Practical cooperation between countries of the Soviet bloc and the ANC started in the mid-1950's and took on a new character just prior to the formation of Umkhonto we Siswe in December 1961. Already in the early 1960's, MK cadres were undergoing training under Cuban supervision in Algeria and later in Tanzania. A significant portion of the NEC received military training in the Soviet Union.[36] Weapons deployed by or captured from the MK in South Africa are uniformly Soviet-made—from grenades, to limpet mines, to rifles. They come via Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, while all major training camps for ordinary MK cadres are located in Angola.[37]

The enormous costs of the massive ANC propaganda campaign throughout the world, although covered by considerable funds from sources in Scandinavia and elsewhere in the West are presumably also covered by substantial Soviet funds flowing to the ANC through its ties with international communist fronts. These fronts promote the ANC's cause in their slogans and campaigns.

Domestic Activities

Although the ANC is still infinitely more effective abroad than in South Africa, it has found somewhat more room for its internal activities during recent years, particularly as a result of changes in the political atmosphere and relaxation of apartheid legislation. This favorable setting, however, disappeared with the more rigid government attitudes that brought the June 12, 1986, declaration of a state of emergency. The ANC activity now consists of recruitment for and the conduct of terrorist operations by the MK, and various political operations through a variety of legal fronts.

MK activities. The Umkhonto we Siswe organization, despite being officially active for almost three decades, is still ineffective and numerically small. Its two operational branches, rural and urban, are both deeply infiltrated by the South African police and intelligence (as, apparently, is the ANC political structure abroad). This was most recently demonstrated on July 9, 1987, when NEC member Cassius Make was tracked down and killed in Swaziland, apparently by South African agents, as a result of information provided by a middle-level ANC cadre who was actually a police agent.[38]

According to South African police sources, the MK is structured into three separate functional branches: suppliers of materiel, who infiltrate the country and establish ammunition, weapons, and explosives caches; middlemen, who supervise the transfer of supplies to the actual operatives; and the operatives, who tend to concentrate in urban areas. The first group is clearly the most effective, as demonstrated by the capture by the authorities of large caches, some in the immediate vicinity of Johannesburg. One such cache, including 880 pounds of explosives, was captured in that area in the spring of 1986.[39] The operations section of the MK is by far the weakest, as has been demonstrated by the high frequency of police penetration of the section, police captures of members, self-inflicted casualties, and generally inept selection of targets.

Almost without exception, MK weapons are of Soviet-bloc origin. The consistent use of Soviet-made limpet mines for urban terrorist bombings is identical to practices of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, pointing toward identical sources of supplies, places of training, and mentality.

The majority of rank-and-file MK cadres are young Blacks from the townships around the Johannesburg-Pretoria-Vereeniging "Vaal Triangle," Port Elisabeth, and Capetown. Unemployed and unskilled, these youths are often lured by promises of education abroad into leaving South Africa, most often via Botswana. In most instances, they are sent to training camps in Tanzania and, particularly, Angola; the largest ANC camp is located at Viana, Angola. The total MK membership is difficult to assess—figures range from a high of 8,000-10,000 cadres abroad and 1,000 inside South Africa,[40] to this author's more conservative estimate of less than half that number, with no more than 300-400 cadres inside the country.[41]

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[35]Oliver Tambo, "Storm over South Africa," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), January 1986, p. 87, emphasis added.

[36]Campbell, op. cit., p. 49. That author cites Stuart, Cassius Make, Mzwandile Piliso, Hani, Maharaj, and Francis Meli as those thus trained. It is difficult to imagine that ex-MK Chief of Staff Siovo also had not been so trained. Odessa and Perebelnaya are most frequently reported as training locations.

[37]See eyewitness testimonies of Deponne Kave, Jeffrey Boego, and Ephraim Mfalapitsa, in *Hearings*, Vol. 1, pp. 350-67, 454-529.

[38]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Africa (Sub-Saharan)* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-AFR*), July 7, 1987, p. D/3; *ibid.*, July 21, 1987, p. D/1.

[39]*The Wall Street Journal* (New York), May 21, 1986.

[40]*Africa Confidential*, Dec. 10, 1986, p. 1.

[41]An assessment based upon listings of casualties, numbers of incidents, and weapons captured, and well as information conveyed to the author in private.

There is little evidence that the dramatic increase in violence in the townships beginning in 1984, which brought on the imposition of a state of emergency in June 1986, was initiated by the MK and even less that it was led by it; on the contrary, all indications are that "necklacing" and burning of houses, although encouraged and condoned by the ANC, its internal fronts and fellow travelers, and the MK, were largely the result of spontaneous, uncoordinated rage by roving gangs of youths—the "comrades." On the other hand, the ANC and MK have not been averse to boasting of the leading role of radicals within South Africa, especially in the townships. The MK has engaged in a variety of actions including bombings and executions of political foes, but in the process has suffered increasing casualties. It has not yet posed a significant threat to the government.[42]

Fronts and infiltration. The most important successes of the ANC within South Africa have come through the operation of legal fronts and infiltration of other existing legal institutions. In fact, the renewed ability of the ANC in the mid-1980's to use legal fronts within South Africa may be the most important development in the history of the organization since the founding of the MK in 1961.

The key legal front organization for the ANC has been the United Democratic Front (UDF), established in Johannesburg on January 1983. It is formally co-chaired by Albertina Sisulu (Walter's wife), and "former" ANC leader Archie Gumede. Among the other members of the UDF Executive Committee are Publicity Secretary "Terror" Lekota, National Treasurer Azhar Cachalia, and General Secretary Popo Molefe. The organization claims to be independent of the outlawed ANC,[43] a claim that the South African government did not explicitly contest until recently (see below).

The impetus for the formation of the UDF was opposition to President P. W. Botha's new Constitution, which established a tricameral parliament with segregated houses for whites, Indians, and Coloreds—and nothing for Blacks. The fact that the constitutional changes also resulted in a significant lessening of government restrictions on Black organizations, a result of years of reforms and domestic relaxation of political tensions, played a significant role in allowing the UDF to exist and expand.

Azhar Cachalia (left) and Albertina Sisulu, leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), hold a press conference on October 9, 1986, in Johannesburg announcing plans to fight in the courts a government order blocking access of the UDF to foreign funds.

The UDF claims to represent a loose unity of some 700–800 individual groups. Originally, many of these groups were formed to press local demands, such as improvement in education and housing, but gradually the UDF came to unite these groups in opposition to apartheid.[44] Many of the groups have overlapping membership; some have only a handful of supporters. Among the UDF's most prominent supporters are some of the religious leaders of South Africa, including Anglican bishop Desmond Tutu (Black); Allan Boesak (Colored), president of the World Alliance of Reform Churches and one of the initiators of the UDF; and Afrikaner clergyman Beyers Naude.

Domestic financial support is quite weak, as was revealed after the government's October 1986 decision to declare the UDF an "affected organization"—i.e., to forbid it to receive funds from abroad. This was a severe blow, for as Cachalia himself admitted, over half of the UDF funds came from abroad, mostly from ANC supporters in Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the United States.[45] In recent months, the UDF has been further weakened by the detention and police interrogation of a

[42] For a summary and evaluation of MK actions in recent years, see Steven Mufson, "The War for South Africa," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 14, 1986, pp. H/1-2.

[43] It is impossible to verify the claim of Gumede and other UDF leaders that they have left the ANC, particularly since nothing in their statements or attitudes indicates any ideological change on their part.

Oliver Tambo has referred to the UDF in glowing terms: " . . . the ANC was pleased, to say the least, when the United Democratic Front was formed in South Africa. The UDF, that outstanding example of the political maturity of our people, is a product of the years that our country's forces of progress have spent . . . ." See "Storm over Africa," loc. cit., p. 88.

[44] Steven Mufson, "End of the Beginning in South Africa: The Fall of the Front," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Mar. 23, 1987, pp. 17-19.

[45] *Africa Confidential*, Jan. 21, 1987, p. 5.

A banner of the United Democratic Front, declaring "People Power" is seen at a February 19, 1986, demonstration in Attidgeville on the occasion of the funeral of a victim of an anti-government riot in that Black township.

large portion of its leadership.[46]

The UDF openly supports the Freedom Charter and campaigns for the legalization of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela.[47] UDF members have been implicated in the "necklacing" of supporters of anti-ANC organizations such as Inkatha and AZAPO and in attempts to discredit or intimidate the leaders of the newly founded United Christian Conciliation Party. Although some elements of the UDF, particularly its "street committees," which the ANC sees as an important part of its "people's war" strategy, continue to operate in the townships, attempts by the organization to intimidate the Lebowa homeland authorities into making Lebowa become an ANC outpost failed. The "street committees," originally intended to initiate the establishment of "liberated areas," seem to be collapsing even in townships like Alexandra (located between Pretoria and Johannesburg). New housing is being built, parents are again insisting on sending their children to school, and police are back on the streets. AZAPO, Inkatha, and local vigilante groups of moderate Blacks have all begun to resist UDF-sponsored intimidation and violence openly and forcefully.[48]

Indians figure prominently in the UDF, despite the front's claim to be a multiracial organization. This is re-

[46]Lekota and Molefe have both been arrested and stand accused of treason. Cachalia is now the acting UDF leader together with Albertina Sisulu. The replacements for Molefe and Lekota—Mohammed Valli and Murphy Morobe respectively—were themselves arrested in July, prompting Cachalia to admit that "This is a very severe blow . . . The rest of the officials of the [United Democratic] Front are either in detention or hiding to evade detention." See *FBIS-AFR*, July 23, 1987, p. D-3.

[47]Zwelakhe Sisulu, Walter Sisulu's son, a committed Marxist trained as a journalist in the United States and an active UDF leader acknowledges that "rightly or wrongly, the UDF is seen as being in alliance with the ANC," and recognizes that "identification" with the Freedom Charter and Nelson Mandela is identification with the ANC. See interview in *Leadership* (Pretoria), No. 4, 1986, p. 88. The presence of Archie Gumede at the March 1986 funeral of Moses Mabhida (late president of the SACP and a long-standing member of the ANC's National Executive Committee) in Maputo symbolizes such identification. See *The Economist Foreign Report* (London), July 31, 1986, p. 6.

[48]For a sympathetic but accurate description of the decline of the UDF and loss of support because of its use of violence, see Mufson, "The Fall of the Front."

portedly resented by some Black members; radical white supporters of the organization retain their own autonomy within the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee.[49] The UDF's present evolution appears to reflect the mid-1950's developments within the ANC itself, with a few better-organized, better-trained, and politically astute non-Black members playing a disproportionately large role, at least behind the scenes (e.g., Maharaj is the member of the ANC's National Executive Committee charged with coordinating front organizations inside South Africa). Even more than in the 1950's, domestic legal, semi-legal, and underground activities are a more natural domain for non-Blacks, who enjoy greater freedom of movement and access to liberal or "progressive" political and religious circles. This has favored Slovo's urban MK operations, with their mixed racial staffing, as compared with Modise's predominantly Black rural activities. However, the abolition of influx control legislation in 1985 may facilitate the movement of Blacks into positions of greater influence in UDF and MK operations.

The second most important legal organization through which the ANC maintains a presence—albeit less direct and explicit—in South Africa are certain unions, particularly members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The word "presence" here is important, for many COSATU leaders are not formally associated with the ANC as members, and COSATU retains functional autonomy from the ANC in practice as well as ideology. However, since the ANC and SACP accept the virtual demise of SACTU, they have looked to COSATU as the "progressive" voice of politicized labor.[50] COSATU is openly and vocally anti-capitalist, Marxist, and pro-ANC, and is prepared to use its industrial muscle for strictly political purposes. Leaders of COSATU made a highly publicized visit to ANC headquarters in Lusaka in 1986 to demonstrate that the unions were not subservient to the political wishes of the powers that be inside South Africa.

In July 1987, COSATU held a national convention at the University of Witwatersrand in downtown Johannesburg, where the group unanimously endorsed the Freedom Charter and called for closer ties with the UDF.[51] COSATU President Elijah Barayi stated: "There can be no freedom in this country unless the African National Congress is involved." UDF Publicity Secretary Murphy Morobe, sought by the police since the imposition of a state of emergency on June 12, 1986, told the conventioneers that the trade unions had become the most powerful antiapartheid force in South Africa.[52]

The nature and goals of COSATU are best defined by the congress's resolutions, adopted on July 17, 1987. Besides subscribing to the ANC's "Freedom Charter," it approved resolutions including: "A decision to forge links with worker organizations in Africa, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Angola, and Mozambique." The justification was that, in the words of Jay Naidoo, COSATU's newly reelected general secretary, "Workers throughout the world are victims of US-government-sponsored terrorism . . . in this country we are also victims of that kind of imperialism."[53] Barayi, reelected president of COSATU, stated: "We demand the right to share the wealth we produce . . . . We don't want all of it, only 50 percent. The rest we will take later."[54]

Unlike SACTU, COSATU is a non-white organization. It has personal and ideological ties to the ANC and shares similar aims and interests at least in the short term. Former SACTU bosses and SACP members Dhlamini and Nkadimeng appear to be the members of the ANC's NEC in charge of relations with this labor group.

ANC Ideology

Throughout the debate over the nature of the apartheid regime in Pretoria, or even over the "number of communists" in the ANC, there has been little scrutiny of the latter's ideology. One thing is certain: the ANC is emphatically not anti-communist. When Ambrose and Tennyson Makiwane were expelled from the ANC in 1975, together with six others, the NEC labelled them as "a clique based on the slogans of racialism, anti-ANC and anti-Communist."[55] It is ironical how the ANC's attempt to provide a multiracial image of itself has turned to the

[49] *Africa Confidential*, Jan. 21, 1987, p. 7.

[50] Joe Slovo has stated, "We are at one with Jay Naidoo, General Secretary of COSATU, when he said: 'Organized workers (in the trade union movement) are not representative of the working class as a whole, but they constitute its most powerful weapon.' The representative of the working class as a whole is a *political vanguard* which we claim to be." This seems to be tacit acknowledgement that the attitudes and aims of COSATU are compatible with the Leninist interpretations embodied by the SACP and its front, SACTU. See Slovo, "South Africa: In the Frontline of National Liberation Struggle," in *Information Bulletin* (London), November 1986, p. 19.

[51] *The Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 1987.

[52] See William Claiborne, "Union Chief Vows End to Apartheid," *The Washington Post*, July 18, 1987.

[53] *FBIS-AFR*, July 20, 1987, p. D8.

[54] *Time* (New York), July 27, 1987, p. 49.

[55] See *Sechaba*, 2nd Quarter 1976, p. 41. At least two prominent ANC defectors who protested against SACP influence in the Congress were murdered in South Africa. Tennyson Makiwane was murdered five years after his 1975 expulsion (see Kave, loc. cit., p. 388), and Bartholomew Hlapane, a former member of the SACP Central Committee and star witness of the US Senate hearings, was killed with most of his family in Soweto in December 1982 (see *Congressional Record* [Washington, DC], Proceedings and Debates of the 97th Congress, Second Session, Dec. 21, 1982, p. 154; and *The Sunday Times* [Johannesburg], Dec. 19, 1982, p. 3).

General Secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions Jay Naidoo (second from right) at a February 4, 1987, press conference announcing plans to support workers engaged in the country's longest retail trade strike.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

advantage of the SACP members in its ranks, most of whom are non-Black: to object to the communist influence is to automatically make oneself vulnerable to accusations of "racialism."[56]

The ANC has come to advocate a multiracial, democratic South Africa governed by the principle of "One man, one vote, majority rule." This tended to distinguish it from its Black "nationalist" rivals, such as the PAC and various ANC dissident factions (Lawrence Makhubu's in the 1960's, and the Makiwanes' in the following decade),[57] and may also have reflected the large non-Black composition of ANC leadership.[58] As the Freedom Charter put it, ". . . South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. . . ."[59] To be sure, at his trial in 1964, Mandela saw as a "vital distinction" between the ANC and the SACP the former's policy of admitting only Africans (i.e., Blacks) and its commitment to "win unity and full political rights for them" contrasting with the SACP's "main goal . . . to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government."[60] But, five

[56]Even to object to Soviet policies was often interpreted as "racialism" as early as the late 1960's. See Omar Bahjee, Amin Cajee, Hoosain Jacobs, and Maurice Mthombeni, "Why We Left Umkhonto we Sizwe," quoted in Gibson, op. cit., p. 71.

[57]PAC's position is explicit: to it, Azania "is made up of two distinct nations: " one, an indigenous African nation and the other, an illegal white settler regime parasitically imposed on it." See *Azania News* (Dar es-Salaam, the official organ of PAC), April 1984, p. 13.

[58]According to Kodi, p. 9, CPSA leader Rebecca Bunting, wife of party founder Sidney Bunting, went so far as to ask the Comintern about guarantees for minorities (i.e., whites) in the event a Black republic were to be established in South Africa.

[59]See Charter text, loc. cit.

[60]See Mandela, "I Am Not a Communist," in de Braganca and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 92.

Even in Mandela's days, the ANC bent its rules against admitting non-Blacks. An example was J. B. Marks, an old Comintern hand, a Colored, and a prominent figure in the CPSA-SACP. On the career of Marks, see Milorad Drachkovich, *Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern*, Stanford, CA, The Hoover Institution Press, 1986, pp. 303-04.

years later, with Mandela still de jure president and Tambo acting president, the differences had basically disappeared; the ANC in exile showed a much more clear Marxist-Leninist approach in stating that its struggle, while still "national," was taking place:

in a new kind of world—a world which is no longer monopolized by the imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of the powerful socialist system has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control meaningful—economic emancipation. In the last resort it is only the success of the national democratic revolution which—by destroying the existing social and economic relationships—will bring with it a correction of the historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a new—and deeper internationalist—approach.[61]

Not only was Mandela's declared belief in Western democracy gone, but it had clearly been replaced with the traditional Soviet-style strategy of a two-stage revolution—"a national democratic" one, to be followed by a "socialist" one. The language of the ANC and SACP have come quite close to one another on this issue. Where the SACP's late leader Moses Mabhida quoted Lenin to the effect that "the national liberation movement is a necessary ally of the proletarian revolution,"[62] a recent statement by the ANC reads:

The national revolution . . . is the special province of the oppressed nationalities; the socialist revolution takes the form of class struggle led by the working class of all national groups. The two revolutions co-exist . . . . They interact. . . . They are as closely knit as Siamese twins. To separate them would need a surgical operation which might kill or cripple both.[63]

With such a unity of views, it is fruitless even to be concerned about whether personal ties link the ANC and the SACP.

By 1969, it was clear from a pamphlet prepared for the Morogoro conference that the rather vague language of the Freedom Charter on economic matters had come to mean the total destruction of capitalism, even of small

1985 Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu pictured during a visit to African National Congress Leader Oliver Tambo in Lusaka on March 22, 1987, during which Tutu urged the ANC to consider renouncing violence in South Africa.

—Reuters Robinson Hoogendoorn

private property.[64] Attacks against "big" companies indicate hostility toward private property; indeed, the rhetoric of the ANC, SACP, and COSATU sounds similar to that of the pre-1979 Sandinistas, the pre-1975 FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), or the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and many other Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups throughout the world. Moreover, the largest "company" by far in South Africa is the government itself. Control over it would mean control over 865,385 people directly employed, as well as 163,195 employees of non-independent homelands,[65] and their families. The known ANC admiration for FRELIMO, Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe, and the MPLA in Angola, suggests what the Freedom Charter's proposed "mixed economic system" would look like. Furthermore, the main ideologue of the ANC, Pallo Jordan, considers free-market economics "a hodge-podge of classical bourgeois economic theory and latter-day Japanese managerial practice" which he sees as "associated with the Thatcherite-Reaganite right wing in English-speaking Western countries."[66]

Moreover, the rejection in the same 1969 pamphlet of the notion that "our nationalism (should) be confused

[61] "Who Are the Liberation Forces?" pamphlet published around the time of the ANC's 1969 Morogoro conference. Text in de Braganca and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 85 (emphasis in original).
[62] *In African Communist*, No. 87, 1981, p. 16.
[63] *Sechaba*, June 1985, p. 8.
[64] See "Who Are the Liberation Forces?"

[65] *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), July 3, 1987.
[66] *The Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), July 17–23, 1987. Jordan also expressed amusement at the naiveté manifested by the Afrikaner Boers who met with the ANC in Dakar the same month when they opined: "You guys [the ANC] are far too smart to nationalize everything in the post-apartheid era."

with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch" was a direct attack against the PAC, a veiled one against Mandela's "ANC for blacks" idea, and a natural theoretical basis for the decision that very year to admit non-Blacks into ANC membership. Thus, by the time of the Morogoro conference, the ANC had practically ceased to be a "Black nationalist" organization and had openly sworn allegiance to "internationalism" in the Leninist sense of class alliance across national boundaries.[67] It is in this context that ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo states: ". . . the (ANC) and the oppressed and exploited peoples of South Africa are an important detachment, a vital and integral part of the anti-imperialist movement . . . ."[68]

Such internationalism entails not only "solidarity," i.e., support for all Soviet-aided groups throughout the world, but also consistent attacks against actions of the United States. On topics ranging from El Salvador and Nicaragua to the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, from demilitarization of the Indian Ocean to the issue of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the ANC has been as consistently loyal to Moscow's policy line as any Warsaw Pact regime. The ANC condemned US "aggression" in Korea in the early 1950's, and praised the Stalinist policies of the 1930's; moreover, it took Moscow's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.[69]

The ANC has been transformed into a Marxist-Leninist organization in which SACP members fit naturally. This is probably the best interpretation of Oliver Tambo's 1981 characterization of relations between the two:

The relationship with the SACP is not an accident of history—the SACP has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people . . . . Ours is not merely a paper alliance . . . it is a living organism that has grown out of the struggle.[70]

Given the rare "positive alignment between the forces of class struggle and national liberation" pointed out by the late SACP Secretary General Moses Mabhida,[71] distinctions between SACP and non-SACP members in the ANC's leadership become largely meaningless.[72]

Conclusion

While claiming to be a "national liberation movement" like the Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African People's Union in Zimbabwe, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the African National Congress is actually a revolutionary movement directed against an independent and sovereign government.

The evolution of the ANC has been unique. Launched as a "nationalist" movement aimed at the political liberation of Blacks and the forging of a national consciousness out of the disparate ethnic allegiances of South Africa's majority race, the ANC remained until the 1950's a largely semi-nationalist organization, enjoying an ethnically homogeneous membership and clear political goals. This is the ANC that is still supported by significant numbers of Blacks in South Africa, by many African countries, and by non-radical Western sympathizers. It is also an organization that no longer exists.

The recent excitement about alleged SACP "control" over the ANC is a sterile exercise. The crucial point is that the ANC itself has become a Marxist-Leninist organization. Communist penetration of the ANC proper is six decades old, and infiltration of the MK has been the case since its creation. Until the mid-1970's, when the last non-Marxists were purged, one could make a reasonable case for the existence of internal tensions within the ANC between Marxists and non-Marxists. Today, the only internal tensions are between the "orthodox"

[67]The pamphlet "Who Are the Liberation Forces?" used the term "internationalism."

[68]"Our Anti-imperialist Commitment," in *ANC Speaks*, Documents and Statements of the African National Congress, quoted in Campbell, op. cit., p. 27. In his Political Report to the Kabwe Conference, Oliver Tambo claimed that "the democratic, anti-feudal, and anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan has been saved with the support of the Soviet Union" (Ibid., p. 28).

[69]Despite having received some help from China, the ANC unflinchingly supported the Soviet position in Moscow's disputes with the Chinese in the early 1960's. The collapse of the short-lived united front between the ANC and the PAC in the early 1960's probably reflected the Sino-Soviet quarrel. See Gibson, op. cit., pp. 59, 74-75. Gibson, himself a radical, notes that "the anti-China line adopted by the ANC was itself motivated from external sources and probably was the counterpart to continuing or increased Soviet material assistance."

[70]*African Communist*, No. 87, 1981, pp. 22-23.

[71]See "Unite under the Leadership of the ANC to End Apartheid! Statement of the South African Communist Party on the State of Emergency," *Information Bulletin*, August 1986, p. 41.

[72]Tambo told *Time* magazine that the ANC is "a body that is not the Communist Party but which has always had CP members since the 1920's. They have always behaved as 100 percent ANC men." See "We Are Nobody's Puppets," Interview in *Time* (New York), Oct. 27, 1986, p. 54.

The late Moses Kotane, "prime SACP secretary general and ANC treasurer general, made similarly implausible claims: "The fact that I am a Communist has never charged or interfered with my representation on behalf of the ANC. When I have been charged with a mission by the ANC National Executive, I have protected and promoted the interests of the ANC . . . . Likewise, when I have been charged with a mission by the Communist Party, I have stuck to the terms of my mandate and defended the interests of the Party. In the formulation of policy I never think of two organizations." From an interview in Sechaba, August 1988, reproduced in Braganca and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 98.

It is difficult to imagine that a long-established Leninist party with credentials like those of the SACP would actually allow its presidents, secretaries general, or chairmen to receive orders from and act upon the interests of a "national liberation" movement.

(pro-Moscow) cadres of the SACP and the other "independent" Marxist-Leninists within the NEC. Both share the same general ideological premises and engage in similar practices regarding internal discipline and decision-making. Where they might differ (and the available evidence is insufficient to prove that they do) is over the racial factor in establishing leadership credentials—i.e., whether an ANC-controlled "Azania" should have a Black or a multiracial Marxist-Leninist leadership.

Given this evolution, the distinction made by some observers between "nationalists" and "communists" among the ANC leadership is really meaningless. Neither group seems committed to a true multiracial democracy in South Africa that would include all races in a power-sharing system guaranteeing both minority rights and property rights for all. Such a system is clearly incompatible with ANC rule, a fact that must be weighed in contemplating the movement's role in South Africa's political future.

The actual strength of the ANC inside South Africa, whether in terms of numbers or sympathies, is well nigh impossible to assess with any precision, particularly in light of the fragmented nature of South Africa's population. For instance, a significant sample of Blacks, when asked to express a preference for a leader of the country were divided between Nelson Mandela (9.7 percent), P. W. Botha (7.5 percent), Desmond Tutu (3.2 percent), and Chief Buthelezi (2.4 percent), and others, while 23.2 percent expressed no favorite.[73] Sympathy for Nelson Mandela runs high across ethnic, political, and age lines. Yet P. W. Botha personally and the "system" also receive high and very significant support among Blacks of all ages and religions, including persons in such symbolic places of Black victimization by apartheid as Sharpeville.

Of the Black movements, Inkatha claims at least one million dues-paying members, has a well-structured organization reaching most of the country, and includes at least some token non-Zulu members. Other new parties, mostly Black in constituency, that have been established recently, e.g., Bishop Mokoena's group and the still newer Federal Independent Democratic Alliance (FIDA) led by businessman John Gogotya, may in time coalesce anti-Marxist, middle-class Blacks of non-Zulu origin. Support for the ANC among Coloreds and Indians—except for a few prominent radicals—is probably lower even than among whites. As for the latter, repeated attempts by liberal or "progressive" elements to establish a dialogue with the ANC have found no echo among the whites as a group and have only strengthened opposition to the ANC.

The mostly teenage Blacks in the urban areas who spontaneously used violence in the name of, but not under the control of the ANC, now seem in retreat. What is left, the hard-core ANC support inside South Africa, is mostly a group of educated, often prominent upper and middle-class Blacks, some self-appointed "student leaders" of all races in elite universities like Witwatersrand, and union bosses of the COSATU type. The overwhelming majority of South Africans, and particularly that country's Black citizens, are still waiting for both solutions and leaders.

As things currently stand, the prospects for the ANC's coming to power are exceedingly slim. The struggle for the townships goes on, with more bombings and executions, but the overwhelming power of the South African state seems sufficient to crush the activities of the MK or UDF. Whether the shift of focus in recent months to activism by COSATU and its member unions marks a significant escalation in the political struggle remains to be seen.

[73] D. J. van Vuuren et al., Eds., *South Africa: A Plural Society in Transition*, Durban, Butterworths, 1985, pp., 346–47.

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CASE

15 October, 1987

NEW FINDINGS ON THE ATTITUDES OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS TO SANCTIONS

Economic sanctions, directed to more or less radical political goals, are favoured by a total of two-thirds of all Blacks in South Africa, according to a new nation-wide survey.

A sample of 800 respondents over 16 years of age, drawn in appropriate proportions from metropolitan, small-town, and rural areas, were interviewed face-to-face in August and September. Forty-six percent of them believed that sanctions must be applied until the South African government stops the Emergency, frees political prisoners, unbans political movements and abandons apartheid. This is the "conditional" position.

A further 21% support an even more adamant view, that sanctions must be kept in force "unconditionally", until the government hands over power to the representatives of the majority.

And twenty-six percent oppose sanctions, fearing that economic growth, which is of benefit to all, will be slowed by sanctions. Only 6% were non-committal.

The survey was designed and supervised by sociologist Mark Orkin, a director of the Independent Community Agency for Social Enquiry, CASE. The interviews and computation were conducted by Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd, the largest South African owned market-research organisation.

In addition to all ten major metropolitan areas, the sample covered a random selection of rural districts and small towns across the entire country. The so-called "independent states" were also included. The sampling, and aggregation of the results, take account of the size of the populations in the respective regions.

Predictably, the demand for sanctions is strongest in the big cities. There, only 14% oppose sanctions altogether. An overall majority, 52%, favour conditional sanctions; and more than a quarter, 29%, demand unconditional sanctions.

Outside the metropolitan areas, opposition to either variation of sanctions remains a minority, but rises to 30% in the rural areas and 36% in small towns.

Support for sanctions tends to be above average among non-Zulus, frequent readers of a newspaper, and members of political organisations. But supporters are not a socio-economic "elite". There is no appreciable difference in the vote for sanctions between the employed or the unemployed, or between the better-off and the less well-off.

Opinion on whether sanctions will actually work in helping to end apartheid is evenly divided across the nation: 42% no, 41% yes, the rest abstaining. But there are clear majorities who believe in their effectiveness among the most educated, the most politically involved, and the most informed respondents: 53, 55 & 66.

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To be able to differentiate among the sanctions positions, the study also tested black support for political tendencies. Nation-wide, 24% support Nelson Mandela or the ANC; 7% the UDF or other pro-sanctions groupings, and 6% Archbishop Tutu. The only opponents of sanctions to receive noteworthy support were Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha at 11%, and P.W Botha or other government figures at 10%. (Sundry other leaders attracted the remaining 4% among them.)

An average of 38% declined to answer this particular question, largely reflecting reticence among less well-informed rural respondents.

Within the metropolitan areas, the figures were: ANC 35%, UDF 13%, Archbishop Tutu 9%, Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha 8%, P.W Botha and government figures 5%, no answer 24%, sundry others 6%.

These metropolitan leadership results display a close continuity with those from the CASE study of disinvestment conducted in metropolitan areas two years ago. The only appreciable changes are that support for the ANC in the cities has risen a few percent, probably partly in response to extensive press coverage of the Dakar talks; while that for Bishop Tutu has fallen a few percent, following his move away from the popular Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal region.

The figures on sanctions are revealing when associated with those on leadership. In the Buthelezi camp, a narrow majority, 51%, oppose sanctions. But the Buthelezi camp accounts for only 8% of the metropolitan vote and 11% of the national total. By contrast, opposition to one or the other sanctions strategy hovers at a bare 8% among the supporters of the ANC, Bishop Tutu, and the UDF and other radical groups. And together these groupings account for 57% of the metropolitan vote and 37% nation-wide. (For those who declined to name their party, the vote on the sanctions options is close to the overall average.)

An important aspect of attitudes to sanctions concerns the potential unemployment implications. Respondents were categorized as "hard-line" if they stood by their sanctions position whatever the unemployment costs; "intermediate" if they were prepared to see some, but not many, blacks unemployed as a result; and cautious if they were reluctant to risk any job losses.

In the national sample, 14% are hard-line, 26% intermediate and 60% cautious.

As one would expect, this variable correlates strongly with affiliation. Among supporters of the ANC, Bishop Tutu and the radical groups alike, the cautious proportion (43%) is substantially smaller than the average, whereas among the Buthelezi and government supporters it is larger (70%). Likewise, regionally, the cautious proportion rises as one moves from city through town to countryside, from 49 through 59 to 66%.

Within the metropolitan region, it seems that opinion on this issue has not softened, despite the experience of the consequences over the last two years. Drawing a comparison in this regard with the previous CASE study on disinvestment, one finds that the levels of support for the hard-line, intermediate and cautious positions on the perceived unemployment implications of economic pressures - then disinvestment, now sanctions - are largely unchanged, at approximately a quarter, a quarter and a half

his evidence of grass-roots opinion on unemployment, in
conjunction with the decisive support expressed for sanctions as
a peaceful strategy for change, reveals a thoughtful interplay
among respondents' priorities, between their shared socio-
political commitments and their individual economic anxieties.

Taken together, the results illuminate the policy decisions on
sanctions of some of the major union federations, black church
groupings and popular political tendencies. To pressurize it
towards dramatic change, they are calling for for sanctions to be
comprehensive rather than partial, and mandatory rather than
voluntary, in the hope that in this way sanctions will achieve
the greatest possible political impact, while causing unavoidable
economic hardship for the shortest possible time.

At the same time, many of them and of their supporters are
prepared to make that call conditional, in that if the government
does introduce the conditions of meaningful democracy as defined
by popular debate and incorporated in the survey question, it
would be reasonable for sanctions then to be lifted.

Main question

Some governments overseas are applying sanctions against apartheid. This means that they have prevented the South African government and businessmen from getting loans from overseas, and prevented them from selling and buying goods and products overseas.

People and groups in South Africa have different views about sanctions. There are three main views. We have laid them out on this card.

HAND RESPONDENT CARD B.

Let us go through them together.

READ OUT

- The first view opposes sanctions. This view says that that everyone benefits when South African economy grows, and that sanctions will slow down economic growth.
  This view is supported by P.W. Botha and the Nationalist Government, by the P.F.P, by businessmen like Harry Oppenheimer, and by homeland leaders like Chief Buthelezi.

- The second view wants conditional sanctions. This view says that sanctions are a peaceful way of pressuring the government until it provides the conditions for democracy, i.e. stops the Emergency, frees political prisoners, unbans political movements, and does away with apartheid. Once the government provides these conditions, sanctions can be stopped.
  This view is supported by Archbishop Tutu, by trade unions in COSATU and NACTU, and by the SA Council of Churches.

- The third view wants unconditional sanctions. This view says that the Nationalist government will never agree to provide the conditions of democracy. So sanctions must be be applied until the government is forced to hand over power to the representatives of the majority of people in South Africa.
  This view is supported by many leaders and members of the ANC, PAC, UDF and AZAPO.

Would you like us to go through the three views again?

REPEAT IF REQUESTED. ASK:

Which one of the views do you support most?

IF "NONE" OR "NO ANSWER", LEAVE BLANK

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support for pressure higher than in 1985

Blacks do back sanctions, warns survey

By PHILLIP VAN NIEKERK

AS the international sanctions movement struggles to maintain its momentum, a major nationwide survey released yesterday has revealed that two thirds of black South Africans support sanctions.

The survey was conducted during August and September by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry. This was the same group which compiled a similar, controversial report two years ago showing that most blacks supported disinvestment by foreign companies.

The survey — which for the first time included people in the rural areas — also revealed that African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela and the ANC are the country's most popular political actors for blacks.

Mark Orkin, a director of Case, said yesterday that the repression of three successive States of Emergency had shown blacks that it was "essential that the full range of pressures should be brought to bear to help end apartheid".



Out of the sample of 800 respondents, 46 percent said sanctions should be applied until the South African government lifted the Emergency, freed political prisoners, unbanned political organisations and abandoned apartheid.

Orkin said 21 percent supported "an even more adamant view" — that sanctions should be enforced unconditionally until the government surrendered power.

Only 26 percent of blacks in the cities and in the rural areas were opposed to sanctions, fearing that it would stunt economic growth.

The results are similar to the 1985 questionnaire when about a quarter of respondents supported hard-line disinvestment, a quarter opposed disinvestment and one half favoured conditional disinvestment.

However, the 1985 poll was conducted only in the cities whereas 59 percent of the respondents in the latest survey were from the rural areas, 14 percent from small towns and 27 percent metropolitan.

In the metropolitan areas, support for sanctions was more widespread. A total of 29 percent favoured hard-

●To PAGE 2

Two-thirds blacks pro-sanctions - poll

●From PAGE 1

line sanctions, 52 percent backed conditional sanctions while 14 percent were opposed to sanctions.

Orkin pointed out that compared to the 1985 figures, the support for economic pressures had increased among blacks in the cities.

A new question — on whether respondents were prepared to continue supporting sanctions if these resulted in job losses for blacks — also produced some surprising results.

The number of hard-liners, who stood by the sanctions position whatever the unemployment costs, declined to 14 percent overall. A second intermediate group who were prepared to see some but not many blacks unemployed as a result of sanctions dropped to 26 percent while 60 percent were not willing to support any job losses.

"The pressure to use economic measures is increasing at the same time as the growth in unemployment is worrying people," said Orkin. "Taken together, the results illuminate the policy decisions on sanctions of the unions, the churches and popular political tendencies.

"They are calling for sanctions to be comprehensive rather than partial, and mandatory rather than voluntary, in the hope that this way sanctions will achieve the greatest possible political impact, while causing unavoidable economic hardship for the shortest possible time."

The survey on political leadership revealed that nationally 24 percent supported the ANC, seven percent the United Democratic Front, six percent Archbishop Desmond Tutu and 11 percent Inkatha while 10 percent supported the government.

Within the metropolitan areas, the ANC received 35 percent, the UDF 13 percent, Tutu nine percent and Inkatha eight percent.

"The leadership figures display a close continuity with the earlier survey," said Orkin. "This confirms the reliability of the study and indicates the steady evolution of black opinion responding to political events.

"Since 1985 the only appreciable change is that support for the ANC has risen a few percent and that Tutu has lost support (from 16 percent in 1985) as he has moved residence away from the Witwatersrand."

The questions were framed so that each position was explained alongside the political groups which support it. For instance, the question for those opposing sanctions, read: "This view is supported by PW Botha, and the Nationalist government, by the PFP, by businessmen like Harry Oppenheimer and by homeland leaders like Chief Buthelezi."

Doubt was cast on the findings yesterday by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, director of the Centre for Policy Studies at Wits University, who was himself criticised for a survey he did two years ago into black attitudes on disinvestment.

Schlemmer said that given that the options on sanctions were linked to political leadership, the question was not about sanctions but a mixture involving both sanctions and support for leaders.

"I am surprised that as many as 26 percent of people oppose sanctions given that to do so would be to associate with the government. That this has been done biases the response against rejection of sanctions.

"This is not comparable with other surveys and the respondent is faced with the critical dilemma to support sanctions or his political leadership."

Orkin said yesterday that as with the earlier study, it was important not only to mention the policy positions but also as background to give the important party political tendencies associated with each position.

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NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC.

1625 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20006 (202) 887-0278

SUMMARY

National Foreign Trade Council
Position Paper

South African Sanctions Legislation

American companies in South Africa have led efforts to end apartheid and bring social, economic and political justice to its non-white majority. They have:

* insured equality and advancement for non-white workers
* devoted hundreds of millions of dollars to programs to improve black education, housing and health care
* initiated and enthusiastically participated in efforts to advance social justice
* encouraged the growth of non-white businesses and trade unions

American businesses believe the most effective method of ending apartheid is action which brings economic and, ultimately, political power to non-whites. Therefore, they have been leading proponents of black empowerment strategies.

The 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid act applied pressure on the South African government to end apartheid by imposing economic sanctions. Pending legislation would prohibit any American business presence in South Africa. The experience since 1986 with sanctions demonstrates this policy is seriously flawed. It has had disastrous consequences for South African Blacks counterproductive to its stated goal of ending apartheid.

Sanctions have had little adverse effect upon the South African economy as a whole. This policy has not driven the South African government to end apartheid by, instead, may have contributed to the government's increasing resistance to change.

Total disinvestment would exacerbate the sanctions policy.

American programs beneficial to black workers would be eliminated. Corporations replacing American companies do not engage in the wide range of enlightened policies undertaken by U.S. corporations. History has proved this fact.

In short, the policy of the United States government toward South Africa should actually contribute to the elimination of apartheid. It should help empower blacks in South africa, not further impoverish them. American companies are helping black

South Africans move toward their own goals of economic and political power. The United States Congress should not ban U.S. companies from South Africa.

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June, 1988

INTRODUCTION

The National Foreign Trade Council is coordinating the legislative efforts of a coalition of major business associations -- which includes the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Council for International Business -- and various companies who are signatories to the Statement of Principles (formerly the Sullivan Principles). These companies believe that the U.S. business presence in South Africa contributes positively to undermining apartheid by their active opposition to that system and by increasing the economic clout of nonwhite South Africans.

These companies and associations oppose additional sanctions because they will not hasten the end of the apartheid system and will be harmful to the interests of black South Africans.

The Statement of Principles companies have operated in South Africa for many years and actively worked to eliminate apartheid. They have consistently led efforts to end apartheid and continue to be in the forefront of enlightened corporate behavior in South Africa.

The signatory companies operate under and promote the following principles:

1. Eliminating laws and customs that impede social and political justice.

2. Increasing the number of blacks, coloreds and Asians in management and supervisory positions.

3. Initiating and developing training programs that prepare blacks, coloreds and Asians in substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical and

technical jobs.

4. Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment by devoting corporate resources to improve housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.

5. Providing equal and fair employment practices for all employees.

6. Assuring that the pay system is applied to all employees without regard to race or ethnic origin.

7. Desegregating all eating, comfort, locker room and work facilities.

They have supported the development of the trade union movement and have devoted corporate resources to development of black businesses. The companies have repeatedly met with various members of the South African government to urge them in the strongest terms to make changes in racially restrictive legislation.

<u>The Statement of Principles companies believe:</u>

* Past attempts to pressure the South African government for change by imposing economic sanctions affecting trade or investment have not helped to eliminate apartheid, have made the South African government less tolerant of reform and have hurt blacks economically.

* Current legislative proposals forcing American companies to totally withdraw from South Africa would also not aid in the struggle against apartheid but would eliminate the significant programs of American companies in to improve the economic, political and social life of nonwhite citizens.

* Pending legislation would result in increased unemployment among blacks and increased wealth for the white South Africans taking over the capital assets of the former American companies.

* The ultimate elimination of apartheid requires the empowerment of blacks economically rather than their further impoverishment through disinvestment and

other economic sanctions.

The members of the coalition believe there is little understanding of the active and responsible role which American companies have played in undermining apartheid in South Africa and the disastrous immediate economic consequences as well as long-term political consequences to black South Africans of total disinvestment.

This paper, therefore, reviews in detail activities of American companies to bring political and economic power to black South Africans, discusses the negative effects of the 1986 sanctions, and points out the certain harmful impact of total disinvestment as would be required by H.R.1580.

ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

American companies operating in South Africa have for years been in the forefront of the struggle to end apartheid and improve the economic and political lives of nonwhite South Africans. Even supporters of total disinvestment acknowledge the positive role played by American companies. American companies not only have made efforts to insure equality and advancement for nonwhite South Africans within the workplace, but have also instituted significant programs to improve conditions within the society as a whole.

1. Workplace

* Nonwhite employees are significantly better paid by U.S. companies operating in South Africa than by most non-U.S. firms. U.S. companies have a minimum wage standard that is a 30 percent premium above the living level for a family of five. In many instances, U.S. firms require their non-U.S. suppliers to conform to similar higher minimum wage standards for their workers.

* The U.S. companies in South Africa spend more than $3 million annually to train nonwhite employees at "industry training centers", many established by American firms.

* In 1985, U.S. companies in South Africa trained 12,209 nonwhite employees for better jobs in their companies. This was an increase of almost 100 percent over the preceding year and advanced training for one out of every five workers in the workforce.

* U.S. companies trained more than 1,700 nonwhites in South Africa for supervisory/managerial jobs in 1985. Another 900 were trained for professional and sales jobs, 3,500 for skilled/clerical/administrative jobs, and 4,300 for entry-level unskilled/semiskilled jobs.

* U.S. companies in South Africa have provided more than 1,000 scholarships for advanced training for their nonwhite employees each year.

* During the last ten years, the number of nonwhite supervisors and managers in U.S. companies has grown steadily. In 1979, one of every six supervisors and managers in U.S. companies was nonwhite. By 1984, the percentage of nonwhite supervisors/managers climbed to 23.2 percent and by 1985 to 24.3 percent.

* U.S. companies have been in the forefront of efforts which have enabled South African workers to organize trade unions and, thus, to participate in the collective bargaining process.

* U.S. companies have opposed South African government efforts to outlaw secondary boycotts. Although vigorously opposing secondary boycotts in the U.S., American companies in South Africa believe that if this tactic is made illegal in South Africa, the efforts of the trade union movement to achieve parity in the workplace for nonwhite workers would be weakened because other forms of political and economic recourse are denied to nonwhites.

2. Education

* During 1979-1986, U.S. companies in South Africa spent approximately $64 million to support nonwhite education and training in South Africa. About $24 million was spent to train and educate the U.S. companies own nonwhite employees and another $23 million was spent to train and educate nonwhites other than their employees, mainly through scholarship programs. In 1986 alone, the programs designed to educate non-employee nonwhite citizens reached a level of $15 million, an increase of more than 11% over the previous year. This provided funding for 11,767 scholarships. The remainder of the educational funds were dedicated to the Adopt-a-School program and other general support programs for education in nonwhite communities.

* U.S. companies in South Africa have "adopted" 424 nonwhite schools in South Africa. Adoption of a school involves financial help, upgrading teaching, and help

of whatever kind the school needs to raise its standards. In 1986, the companies contributed $1.5 million to these schools. In addition to financial assistance, more than 20,000 man-days assistance were provided for adopt-a-school programs, which benefited 277,815 nonwhite students.

* READ, the major literacy program in South Africa, receives the bulk of its support from U.S. companies. It promotes literacy among nonwhite children and adults, provides libraries for nonwhite schools, and upgrades nonwhite teacher training. In six years, READ has run literacy programs at 684 schools, colleges and youth clubs.

* U.S. companies actively support efforts to develop farm skills which are crucial to South Africa's ability to feed itself. For example, U.S. companies worked closely with the Boskop Training Facility at Potchefstroom, which is the only facility in South Africa geared to training in basic farm skills. Some 95 percent of the Boskop trainees are nonwhite.

* In 1986 alone, American companies assisted several hundred nonwhite workers to obtain their journeyman certificates, a coveted trade position.

* At Kwamashu in the Natal, an area which has experienced significant incidences of violence, the U.S. companies are transforming the Nyabakazulu school into a comprehensive high school offering vocational education in technical and academic fields so nonwhites can qualify for better jobs.

3. Housing

* U.S. companies individually and collectively, petitioned the South African government vigorously to permit outright ownership of property by nonwhites outside the homeland. This effort utilized the public press, individual and joint meetings with government officials, and joint action with like-minded South African organizations. In 1986, the law was changed to permit ownership of properties by nonwhites.

* Prior to the change in the property ownership law, U.S. companies had played an important role in assisting black families to take advantage of the 99-year lease opportunity to acquire housing accommodations. U.S. company efforts resulted in the acquisition of approximately 10 percent of all of the 99-year leases

granted throughout South Africa.

* U.S. companies provide subsidized housing loans, loan guarantees, and outright grants and counseling to assist their employees in securing adequate housing. As a result, 40 percent of the nonwhite employees of U.S. companies own their homes.

* U.S. companies have provided $6.2 million to develop decent housing for non-employee families.

* The Group Areas Act specifies particular living areas for each race. Despite this fact, and as a direct result of the support of U.S. companies, increasing numbers of nonwhites are moving into and residing in "whites only" areas. These areas have become known as "gray areas" because they actually are de facto mixed-race areas.

* The U.S. companies have often led the way in developing recreation and sports facilities and programs for nonwhites, and desegregating sports activities. Through 1985, the companies had spent more than $3.5 million to build sports and recreation facilities in nonwhite areas - $800,000 in 1985 alone.

4. Health Care

* U.S. companies have donated more than $8.5 million for the improvement of nonwhite health care facilities. The bulk of this has been devoted to Adopt-a-Clinic programs, financing, equipping and supporting clinics in nonwhite neighborhoods. Other American companies assisted mobile units to offer medical assistance to underprivileged communities across South Africa or encouraged their medical staffs to spend time in the surrounding communities and schools.

* The 23 million nonwhites in South Africa are served by only 600 Black physicians and 17 Black dentists. An organization called MESAB - Medical Education for South African Blacks - was established to help South African Blacks entering the medical profession. Funding for MESAB has come primarily from the U.S. companies.

* The U.S. companies are a major force working to desegregate South African hospital wards. For example, the Johannesburg General Hospital's cancer and heart units are already multi-racial.

5. Black Business Assistance

* U.S. companies in South Africa helped 3,830 nonwhite business enterprises get started and grow in 1985 and about the same number in 1986. They provided consulting and assistance to nonwhite business firms amounting to $14 million in the five years ending with 1986. In 1986, they spent over 17,000 employee days assisting nonwhite entrepreneurs.

* In 1986, U.S. companies bought $11 million in products and services from nonwhite enterprises, a 38 percent increase over 1985. This figure rose to $13.5 million by June, 1987.

* Additional U.S. company assistance to new nonwhite enterprises is funnelled through the Small Business Development Corporation, to which the companies contributed $1 million in 1985.

* In Capetown, the U.S. companies sponsor a special group of nonwhite managers employed by them whose role is to encourage and support South African nonwhite leaders and businessmen in developing and implementing programs initiated by the nonwhite community.

6. Social Justice

* The U.S. companies have set up Legal Aid Clinics to aid residents at no charge on matters ranging from pass law violations to major criminal prosecutions.

* In Pretoria, the U.S. companies have taken legal action to force the Department of Education of Transvaal to accept nonwhite students in any college in its jurisdiction.

* At meetings with Members of Parliament, including the ruling National Party, company representatives have stressed the necessity of ending the Group Areas Act. In addition, U.S. companies are helping move nonwhite families into a suburb called Mayfair West, where nonwhite residence is technically illegal.

* American companies have expended millions of dollars and thousands of man days in efforts directly intended to develop the public, political and economic pressure necessary to loosen the shackles of apartheid. These efforts involved direct communications between CEOs and Cabinet Ministers as well as providing organizational resources for labor and local leaders.

The record of American companies in South Africa clearly demonstrates they are a force for change. Within the workplace and in the society as a whole, American business is in the forefront of bringing economic and political pressures to bear to end apartheid and empower nonwhite South Africans.

BLACK EMPOWERMENT

There is growing evidence that sanctions are largely counterproductive and that black empowerment is the most potent weapon against the apartheid system. Unlike sanctions, black empowerment embodies clear and achievable goals which work to the direct advantage of black South Africans and to the ultimate erosion of apartheid. Apartheid simply cannot coexist with black empowerment. Clearly, therefore, the policy of the U.S. government should be to assist black empowerment. In a paper on the U.S. government's policy in South Africa, Michael Clough, Senior Fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently noted the following:

> "The expansion of black power has been underway in South Africa for several decades. Economic forces are only one factor in this process. Making support for black empowerment the cornerstone of U.S. Policy would involve recognizing that this process, rather than white politics or government policy making has become the most important factor in the South Africa equation. It is, for example, the nature and pace of black empowerment, not white predispositions or political maneuvering, that is the most critical determinant of the prospects for genuine negotiations. Until there is a decisive shift in the balance of power in South Africa, there is little prospect that whites will agree to negotiate; once a shift begins, negotiations will become inevitable. Similarly, it is the political social and economic character of black empowerment, not largely white dominated discussions of possible constitutional formula, that will ultimately be the most important influence in the shaping of post apartheid South Africa." (Beyond Sanctions: Reorienting U.S. Policy on South Africa, Michael Clough, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y. 1988)

American companies will continue to pursue the following goals:

* The abolition of all statutory race discrimination;

* Full South African citizenship for all people of South Africa;

* Negotiations between the government and acknowledged black leaders regarding power sharing;

* Release of Nelson Mandela; and

* The end of the state of emergency in South Africa.

IMPACT OF SANCTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In October 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA or Act). Congress intended to apply pressure on the South African Government to end apartheid. For several reasons, the Act has been unsuccessful and has had a number of unintended and undesirable results.

First, the sanctions have had little adverse effect on the economy as a whole.

Second, the sanctions have caused the South African Government to become firmly entrenched in resisting needed change.

Third, the sanctions have adversely affected black South Africans, the very people the Act was intended to assist. Fourth, the sanctions have limited United States access to South African minerals strategic to the U.S. economy and national defense, while increasing U.S. dependence on the only other major supplier of these minerals, the Soviet Union.

Fifth, the U.S. uranium conversion and coal industries have been hurt by the sanctions.

1. Effects of Sanctions on the South African Economy

Statistics and other economic indicators clearly suggest that the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government have had little effect on the South African economy as a whole. In fact, the South African economy registered a growth rate of approximately 2.6 percent in 1987, up 0.5 percent from 1986.

The statistics with respect to South African exports also illustrate this point. Exports from South Africa have increased every year from 1984 through 1987. South Africa exported $21.6 billion of goods in 1987 compared with $16.9 billion in 1984. This increase was achieved despite a decrease in exports to the United States from $2.6 billion to $1.4 billion during this same time period.

Other export figures further explain the sanctions' lack of economic impact. For instance, sixty percent of South Africa's export earnings are derived from gold bullion and strategic metals not covered by the CAAA. The political uncertainty caused by the sanctions has facilitated a worldwide rise in gold prices from $280 per ounce in 1985 to $463 per ounce in October 1987, thus contributing significantly to these earnings. Also significant is the fact that the CAAA's ban on exports of agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron, steel and textiles, comprised only 17 percent of the total South African exports of these commodities and only 4.5 percent of the total exports of all South African goods.

Likewise, the sanctions have failed to have a significant impact on South African imports. Like its exports, its imports have risen from $10.8 million in 1984 to $14.3 million in 1987.

South Africa's well-developed infrastructure and industrial base have made it particularly invulnerable to economic sanctions. The country's foreign dependence on vital resources is minimal. For example, it maintains substantial food supplies so that it is able to export such products and its dependence on imported oil is considered small by international standards. Additionally, since the imposition of sanctions, South Africa has increased its development of nuclear energy and stockpiled its oil surpluses. These factors, combined with the fact that importation of U.S. goods comprise only 0.3 percent of all South African accounts, help to explain why South Africa was able to raise its Gross Domestic Product 2.6 percent in 1987.

One method South Africans have used to avoid the impact of the sanctions is increasing trade with other nations and diverting their goods to third countries not restricted by the sanctions. For example, South Africa's trade with Taiwan has increased from $135 million in 1985 to $911 million in 1987. This figure is expected to increase to $3 billion by 1990. Similarly, South Africa's trade with the Japanese amounted to $4.27 billion in 1987, 62 percent higher than that with the United States.

South Africans have also developed a number of other methods to circumvent the CAAA including, for example, the formation of offshore trading companies, the rerouting of air service, and the reregistration by South African fishermen of their ships to the Cayman Islands thereby enabling them to ship South African

lobster tails to the United States as a Cayman product.

In addition, voluntary disinvestment by U.S. corporations demonstrates that disinvestment has created huge windfall business opportunities for white South Africans. Many American corporations divesting their South African holdings have sold their interests to local, white-controlled firms, often at firesale prices, creating new white South African millionaires in the process and providing few new ownership opportunities for black workers.

Thus, concentration through disinvestment of more of South Africa's wealth in local white hands, at least in the short term, has marginally enlarged the economic gap between black and white South Africans. Certainly, it should be a basic thrust of United States policy in South Africa to encourage greater black economic power rather than increase the wealth of white South Africans who support apartheid.

2. Effect of Sanctions on South African Blacks

Unlike the South African economy as a whole, which has not been significantly affected by the sanctions, South African blacks have had to bear the financial, political and social brunt of many of the economic measures imposed by the United States. The damage to the South African economy has been fairly limited to specific sectors of the economy but within those sectors the damage has been felt mainly by black workers.

Blacks have borne a tremendous burden with respect to the levels of unemployment. Joblessness, estimated at 3 million, has been increased by up to 300,000 annually over the past three years. In addition, according to one survey reported in the Washington Post on October 22, 1987, 5,800 black workers have lost their jobs as a direct result of U.S. corporations terminating their operations or selling their South African holdings. The most hard hit as a result of the sanctions have been the labor-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and coal. The deciduous fruit industry claims it has had to layoff 12,000 seasonal workers. The coal industry has laid off 8,000 workers over the past 18 months and industry officials predict the lost of another 2,000 jobs this year. Ninety percent of these workers are black. The iron and steel industry has announced approximately 1,300 layoffs.

These current unemployment figures tell only one part of the story regarding the sanctions and unemployment. It is estimated that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in South Africa of 5-6 percent per annum will be necessary to create jobs for the 350,000 new workers who will enter the labor force each year. To the extent that sanctions contribute to a slowdown in GDP growth,

the sanctions will contribute to increasing unemployment that will hit black South Africans the hardest.

Moreover, the pullout of U.S. corporations may have a significant effect on the wages earned by blacks. By mid 1986, the lowest wage paid by any signatory company was 60 percent above the median wage for laborers working in the non-farming sector. While the new owners of former U.S. companies assert that they will not lower the present wages, a report of the Investor Responsibility Research Center has noted that the new owners will fight to keep wage increases down in an effort to achieve more market-oriented rates of pay. Additionally, of the many firms that have recently purchased U.S. companies, future earnings will likely be directed toward retiring the debt related to the purchase of these companies and to the protection of the new owners' investments, thereby diverting future earnings away from wage increases to black workers.

Perhaps the most significant concern about disinvestment is that its implementation will negate the advancements achieved by blacks through the implementation of the Statement of Principles and other on-going community development efforts of American companies. Those South African or other foreign corporations which replace the American businesses in most cases do not carry on the workplace and community social justice programs established by American companies. If total disinvestment is mandated those efforts will obviously end. The Investor Responsibility Research Center concluded that company contributions to community development projects and social change organizations will drop to half their former level if American firms are forced to leave.

Moreover, another unintended and undesirable result of the sanctions has been the negative restructuring of the political environment to the detriment of peaceful opposition groups and black South Africans generally.

For example, President P.W. Botha, running on a platform deploring American interference in the internal affairs of South Africa, swept to a substantial victory in the country's most recent elections. In addition, the sanctions have frightened the white voters of South Africa. Such fear was seen in the elevation of the conservative party to opposition status thereby replacing the liberal party.

The current political climate has created an increased "laager mentality" (the Boer equivalent of a bunker) within the South African government and fostered defiance and resistance to needed change. This was evident when shortly after the enactment of the CAAA, the South African government cracked down on the United Democratic Front, the country's major opposition group, accelerated its policy of forced removal of blacks and started an

aggressive campaign against neighboring Mozambique. Such pro-apartheid measures have coincided with an increasing decline in U.S. influence in the country.

3. Effect of Sanctions on the United States Economy

The economic sanctions imposed on South Africa through the CAAA have had a significant effect on limiting the United States' ability to obtain minerals strategic to the U.S. economy and the national defense and has increased U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union for such minerals. In addition, the U.S uranium conversion and coal industries have been hurt by the sanctions.

With respect to strategic minerals, the United States has historically relied on South Africa for a large percentage of such resources. In 1986, South Africa supplied the U.S. with 56 percent of its chromite consumption, 26 percent of its manganese, 41 percent of its platinum group metals and 52 percent of its cobalt. These minerals are vital to the U.S. economy and the national defense. The availability of such resources in the United States is insignificant and the only other major source worldwide is the Soviet Union. The U.S. Bureau of Mines has estimated that the direct economic costs to the United States resulting from an embargo on South African strategic minerals would be $1.85 billion a year.

The CAAA has curtailed the flow of these strategic minerals from South Africa into the United States and has caused the United States to become dependent on the Soviet Union to replace such imports.

Not coincidentally, as a result of the sanctions, U.S imports of chrome from the Soviets surged to 6,440 gross tons per month based upon a six month average ending March 31, 1988. This figure is compared to only 479 gross tons per month from 1981-1985. (Chrome is essential for the production of stainless steel and super alloys.) Moreover, upon passage of the CAAA, the Soviets began development of a new chrome mine with an annual capacity of two million tons and expanded their production of antimony. Like chrome, imports of antimony from the Soviets, essential for the manufacture of bullets, computers and radar, have also increased during this same period.

Aside from an increased dependence on the Soviet Union for strategic minerals, the U.S. coal and uranium conversion industries have also been adversely affected by the economic sanctions. Due to a fear that the sanctions would hurt their $45 million-a-year exporting industry, South African coal producers slashed their prices in hopes of attracting new foreign markets while maintaining old ones. Coal consumers responded by either buying the cheaper coal or by putting pressure on other producers

to lower their prices. The United States, due to its stringent environmental regulations and relatively high wages, was hardest hit, suffering a loss of about $250 million over the past three years. During this same period, the coal industry witnessed a drop in steam coal prices from $48.21 a ton to $41.99 a ton.

Likewise, the CAAA has injured the United States uranium conversion industry. Section 309 of the Act, while prohibiting the importation of uranium ore and oxide, provides a loophole for uranium hexaflouride gas. As a result, foreign utilities have been purchasing the uranium from South Africa, where it undergoes the conversion process before ultimately being shipped to the United States. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the banning of uranium ore, without explicitly providing the same for uranium hexaflouride, hurt the U.S. uranium conversion industry without reducing the amount of South African uranium entering the United States.

CONCLUSION

American businesses in South Africa have played an important role in efforts to eliminate apartheid and empower nonwhite South Africans economically and politically. They have carried on these efforts both in the workplace and in society as a whole. Without doubt, American businesses are a positive force for change within South Africa.

There is a broad consensus within the United States for vigorous efforts by both our public and private sectors to work toward the complete elimination of apartheid within South Africa. The Statement of Principles companies have long supported this view and intend to continue maximum efforts to accomplish this goal. While there may be differences of opinion on the best methods of reaching this end, there is no disagreement as to the goal itself.

The experience with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act proves that the use of sanctions and disinvestment does not contribute to ending apartheid, but has unintentional effects which work to the detriment of nonwhite South Africans. The policy of the American government must go beyond symbolic gestures and actually contribute to ending the apartheid system. The most direct and concrete path to that end is the empowerment of the nonwhite majority in South Africa. To the extent that United States government policies assist in that effort, they should be vigorously pursued; to the extent that those policies hinder that process, they should be abandoned.

June 1988

TO: Nancy Stetson

FROM: Greg Craig

SUBJECT: SFRC Testimony

During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Kennedy agreed to provide the names of groups and individuals from South Africa that Senator Kennedy or members of his staff met with during 1987. That list follows:

Groups

Operation Hunger
The Government of South Africa
The United Democratic Front
The South African Council of Churches
The African National Congress
Detainees' Parents Support Committee
National Medical and Dental Association of South Africa
National Union of Miners
The South Africa Foundation
The Urban Foundation
Get Ahead, South Africa
IDASA
Black Sash
National Education Union of South Africa
Concerned Social Workers' Group of South Africa
Anglo-American Corporation

Individuals

Anthony James Leon
Michael Rocholt
John Rees
Ina Perlmann
Amb. Piet Kornhoof
Michael Farr
Malcolm Ferguson
Mpho Tutu

Eric Mafuna
James Motlatsi
Fanyana Mazibuko
Oliver Tambo
Tabo Mbeke
Johnny Makitini
John Chettle
Don MacRobert
Dr. Nthato Motlana
Matabata
Von Zyl Slabbert
Beyers Naude
Auret Van Heerda
Ivan Toms
Frank Chikane
Dr. Jerry Coovadia
Patrick Makhoba
Pule Nape
Sylvia Jele
Audrey Coleman
Michael Rice
Marumo Moerane
Peter Harris
Dean T. Simon Farisani
William Tshabala
Zanodumo Mntambo
Terry Sacco
Dr. Mamphela Ramphele

STAFF INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN EXILES BY THE "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS"

(By Phil Christenson)

During the period June 1-June 15, 1988 I conducted a staff investigation of alleged abuses of the human rights of black South African refugees who have sought asylum in other countries in Africa. The investigation was conducted in Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana. Several dozen black South African refugees, all former members of the so-called "liberation movements", were interviewed about their experiences in exile. All were young men and women, now in their late 20s or early 30s, who had left South Africa after participating in student protests in 1976 and 1977. Many of those interviewed live in fear of retribution by the liberation movements if their assistance to this investigation is discovered. Others are illegal immigrants who fear arrest and deportation, and possible execution by the ANC. All were promised confidentiality.

This investigation was prompted by the State Department's April 15, 1988 report concerning ANC prison camps in Angola and detention facilities in other countries. Although submitted in compliance with Section 1223 of Public Law 100-204, the report submitted to the Congress provided practically no additional information to the Congress other than that already known by Committee staff.[1] It was deemed necessary that the Committee staff undertake an independent investigation of these issues in light of the Department's lack of useful information on this issue.

Racial Discrimination Against Black Refugees

The treatment of black South African refugees by the host countries, by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and by the United States Government, differs substantially from the treatment white South African refugees receive from these same organizations. White South African exiles are well treated. As a routine and established practice white refugees are assisted in gaining immediate asylum in developed (and predominantly white) countries of North America, Europe, Australia. Their treatment and the countries of asylum guarantee that white South African refugees are fully protected in the exercise of their freedom of speech and political association.

According to several dozen black South African exiles interviewed during this investigation, black South African exiles are treated in a much different manner. They are given minimal financial support, forced to join political organizations affiliated with the Soviet Union (either the ANC or PAC), held under close scrutiny of Eastern European trained internal security agents(known in the ANC camps as the "commissars"), and are subject to brutal punishment, including execution, for political dissent.

Refugees interviewed in different countries told the same tale of their treatment. All were refugees who had fled South Africa during the 1976/1977 racial disturbances after having participated as students in the demonstrations against the South African Government. While participating in these demonstrations, they became fearful that the South African security police would arrest them, and they fled the country to Swaziland or Lesotho.

Once across the border, the refugees reported, they were pressured or induced (normally by promises of scholarships to study in the United States or western Europe) to join either the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan African Congress of Azania (PAC). One group interviewed indicated that, in 1977, a "Mr. McNamara" of the UN High Commission for Refugees' office in Swaziland told them that they had to join either the ANC or the PAC[2]

Reports by refugees interviewed in different countries consistently claimed that they had fled South African without any intention of joining a so-called "liberation movement". They had become fearful of the South African security police, but had little knowledge of either the ANC or PAC. Most were associated in a vague fashion with the black consciousness movement, which was then very popular among black students.

Once they joined one of the so-called "liberation movements", they were shipped at UNHCR expense to Tanzania or Zambia, and placed in refugee camps sponsored by the UNHCR. Those who joined the PAC reported uniformly that they were reasonably well treated.

Political Oppression, Torture, and Murders by the ANC

Former ANC members speak of life in an ANC camp as one of fear, mistrust of one another, and especially fear of being sent to "The West".[3]

Those who have escaped the ANC reported to me that the arbitrary detentions for political dissent, beatings, and even deaths from beatings routinely take place in the ANC camps in Tanzania. ANC "commissars" and disciplinary committees make it their practice to remind inmates of the ANC camps that dissidents may find themselves sent to "The West". Political dissidents disappear in the middle of the night and are believed by the refugees to have been abducted by the ANC commissars and transported to "The West".

The escapees further reported that the Tanzanian Government has intervened from time to time to investigate the killing of ANC inmates. The Government of Tanzania has made it clear that it will not tolerate executions by the ANC of political dissidents or suspected "spies". Instead, these escapees reported, the Tanzanian Government permits the African National Congress to transport political dissidents from the ANC camps in Tanzania to the ANC prison camp in Angola, where the ANC conducts its executions. Reliable information was received that at least 10 executions a year of political dissidents or suspected spies take place each year at the ANC prison camp in Angola.

Because the ANC murdered a former ANC member who assisted the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism investigating the ANC, it is not possible to provide names or other identifying information in this written report about those who discussed these sensitive matters with the Committee staff. An interview with a source of great credibility told me that at the ANC camp in Mazimbu, outside the Tanzanian town of Morogoro, two or three women refugees were locked in a shipping container for three or four weeks by the ANC "commissars" last year because of their refusal to have sex with the ccommissars. When the youths of the the camp went to the two "elders" (older inmates who have been in the ANC since 1961), the result was that the ANC Chief Representative in Tanzania imposed discipline on those who complained rather than on the "commissars".

This source continued to report that a "Robert Nyembe"[4], from Johannesburg, had been an inmate at Mazimbu after having been released from the ANC prison in Angola. Once back at Mazimbu, "Mr. Nyembe" spoke out about what was going on in Angola, the killings, the beatings, etc.. According to the source, the ANC commissars seized Mr. Nyembe

and beat him to death. Because of time constraints, this source was unable to locate other ANC escapees who were living in hiding in the country where the interview took place.

Another refugee interviewed described his personal experience of having been beaten by the ANC "commissars" and accused of being a BOSS agent (i.e., a spy). He reported that five "commissars" beat him so severely in the face that he could not even eat soft foods such as corn porridge without painkillers, and required hospitalization. As part of his interrogation by the commissars, the bottom of his feet were also severely beaten. He claims that his life was saved because the Tanzanian Government representative for the camp learned of his plight and rescued him. After being released from the hospital, this refugee was held in a detention cell for three months by the Tanzanian Government representative to protect him from the ANC "commissars". After his release, he fled the country.

The State Department report of April 15, 1988 claims that mistreatment in the ANC camps in Tanzania does not take place, and cites the presence of Scandinavian aid program officials working with the ANC at these camps as the source of the Department's position. Refugees who have escaped from the ANC camps and who are now in several countries contradict the Department's assertion. They report that any ANC inmate, other than senior officials, who associates with the European aid workers makes himself the object of attention for the ANC security "commissars". One escapee reported that he was interrogated by the "commissars" after having been spotted talking to a Swedish SIDA aid worker. He reported being much more careful about his contact with Europeans thereafter because the next step after interrogation would be to be taken to "a workshop". A "workshop" is the refugees' slang expression for the commissars' torture rooms.

Former ANC members who had been in the ANC camps in Tanzania reported that the ANC camp at Dakawa is used as a prison. Some claimed that Sections 16, 17, and 18 at the Dakawa refugee camp were the prison sections. Another claimed that a smaller camp adjacent to Dakawa, called Kitete, was a military facility used as a prison. A third refugee, who was imprisoned at Dakawa, claimed simply that Dakawa is a prison camp, but a minimum security prison used as a warning against further dissent.

US government officials are denied access to the ANC camps in Tanzania. Although the United States government, through a contract with the African-American Institute, paid for the construction of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College at the ANC's main camp at Mazimbu, officials from the United States Government have been consistently refused access to the camp.

Role of the UNHCR

Black South Africans who have experienced the UNHCR callous disregard of their basic human rights do not believe UNHCR deserves such distinction. They see the UNHCR as operating hand in glove with the ANC to oppress black South African refugees. Some refugees who have escaped from the ANC reported pressure from Mrs. Zonelli Mbeki, a high ranking officer of the UNHCR formerly assigned to Nairobi and now assigned to UNHCR's office in Lusaka, to rejoin the ANC. She is reported to have offered to have UNHCR pay for their transportation costs back to Tanzania. Mrs. Mbeki is the wife of the ANC Information Secretary and Executive Committee member Thabo Mbeki. Several refugees interviewed indicated that they protect their families in South Africa from ANC retribution by never revealing their true identities, even (and perhaps especially) to the UNHCR.

UNHCR has created a structure in which black South African refugees are forced primarily into three countries: Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. UNHCR arranges for and pays for the transfer of black South African refugees from their countries of first asylum (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) to these countries of final asylum where they are consigned to "refugee camps". According to official publications of the UNHCR, its "operating partner" for programs of assistance to South African refugees is the African National Congress.

It is only for South African (and Namibian) refugees that the UNHCR operates its refugee assistance programs through the offices of an armed political movement. Other UNHCR programs operate through local government or private voluntary agencies. One must wonder how the United States Department of State could accept a UNHCR decision that a black South African refugee has to go to the African National Congress, a movement associated with the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union, in order to obtain UNHCR assistance.

While for the purposes of channeling U.S. taxpayer funds to support the African National Congress, the South African refugees under the control of the ANC are considered "refugees" by the UNHCR, for all other purposes they are not considered refugees by the UNHCR. The Tanzanian Government and the UNHCR in Tanzania claims that there are no South African refugees in Tanzania. In Zambia, the ANC is considered an armed liberation movement whose relationship with the host government are not through the normal refugee department, but through the Ministry of Defense. The Zambian and Tanzanian governments generally permit the ANC to act as government-in-exile with almost total abdication by the host government of its law enforcement and judicial authority over

the ANC. The UNHCR does not intervene in any country to protect the human rights of black South African refugees from abuses carried out by the ANC.

By far, the largest concentration of black South African refugees purportedly under UNHCR auspices are the 10,000 "refugees" living in the ANC-run camps outside of Luanda, Angola. Angola is not a country that is highly regarded for its human rights record. It would be reasonable to assume that conditions for all South African refugees in Angola are substantially worse than those reported by the refugees who have escaped the ANC camps in Tanzania. I have personal knowledge about the daughter of a close friend. She was one of the students who fled South Africa in 1976 after student protests. She refused to join the ANC once in exile, and was sent to Angola, where she was beaten and raped in an ANC prison until the ICRC was able to obtain her release in 1979. She still suffers from the memories of her Angolan experience, and late at night she calls her father (collect, as daughters are wont to do) in tears from her current asylum in Western Europe. One wonders how it was possible for the United States, which pays 30% of the UNHCR's operating budget, and other western countries to agree in the mid-1970s that Angola should be the principal place of asylum for the black South African students then fleeing the country.

Exiles reported that efforts to obtain the assistance of the UNHCR or local authorities were fruitless. Mr. George Chaponda of the UNHCR office in Nairobi is reported to have told former ANC members seeking UNHCR assistance that "everyone supports the ANC" and that they are "deserters" who should get no assistance. The UNHCR office in Nairobi, however, does offer to pay the cost of travel back to Tanzania so that former members can rejoin the ANC and PAC. (Some exiles reported that when really desperate, they played the game of going to the UNHCR, saying they wanted to rejoin the ANC, receiving money from the UNHCR for their travel, then buying food and other necessities.)

UNHCR has also adopted a Catch 22 procedure which in essence cooperates with the ANC security "commissars" in their political oppession of dissident former members of the ANC. Dissident members who escape from the ANC camps in fear for their life and safety are told by the UNHCR that they have to return to the camps and obtain a "resignation letter" from the ANC in order to qualify for UNHCR assistance. Such instructions are viewed, quite rightly in the light of reported executions of political dissidents in Angola, as an invitation to suicide.

On rare occasion, rank and file members of the ANC are permitted to resign from the organization. The PAC seems to be willing to allow its members in Tanzania to quit, but the

ANC has a much stricter policy. Once the member resigns, life becomes exceedingly harsh.

Harsh Conditions at Kigwa

Tanzanian Government policy does not permit former members of the ANC or the PAC to retain asylum in the country, and requires that they be sent to a camp at Kigwa, outside the town of Tabora. Residents in Kigwa live in a malaria-and snake infested region and receive practically no medical assistance. They receive an allowance of approximately $6 a month, from which they are expected to purchase all the necessities of life (including medicine) which they are unable to raise on their own. UNHCR and the Tanzanian Government provide the refugees at Kigwa with a hoe, some seed, and a small plot of cleared land.

Refugees at Kigwa were interviewed. Almost all were high school and university students from large cities (Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and Durban) when they fled the country. Witnessing the conditions under which these young men are being forced to live, I concluded that there existed elements of retribution and racism in the decision to force them to remain at Kigwa. The young men at Kigwa are almost all the sons of the South African black urban middle class and of a twentieth century urban enviornment. The most politically active segment of the black population in South Africa are the sons and daughters of the urban black middle class and elite.

At Kigwa, they are forced to go back several centuries to earn their sustenance with the agricultural techniques of least developed, uneducated peasant farmers. Life at Kigwa is unrelentingly hard physical labor in the tropical sun, and a day to day struggle for survival. One refugee spoke of the contrast between his life as a student and his current plight. At home, his family's morning routine was to get up, turn on the radio, read the paper, make some tea and toast, and start the day not unlike the morning routines of most Americans. In the evenings, dinner was meat, vegetables, and the like. His life at Kigwa in the past six years has forced him to endure periods of semi-starvation in the lean times before harvest when he had to limit himself to one meal a day, while "meat is unheard of". His sole source of animal protein was an occasional piece of dried fish.

Admittedly, the life of South African refugees at Kigwa does not differ substantially from that of the Tanzanian and Burundian peasants around them, but the South Africans were no peasant farmers in their country of origin. They were full-fledged members of an urban society with closeaffiliations with the United States and Western Europe, which is located in a temperate climate. In terms of life experiences, daily living patterns and standards, and

educational achievements and expectations, they have little in commom with their neighbors at Kigwa, who are Burundian peasant farmers who fled from ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Watutsis in Burundi. One has to question whether the treatment of South African refugees is not based on racism. One cannot imagine that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the United States Government, and other western governments would create a structure that would force white high school and university students fleeing the Soviet Union, Poland, or other repressive regimes to move to a malaria and snake infested region of the tropics, hand them a hoe and a bag of maize seed, and expect them to eek out a livelihood as a 16th century peasant farmer.

One of the refugees at Kigwa put this issue clearly when he asked " If I was an American, would they treat me this way?"

Black South African Refugees in Africa Can Never Be Safe

UNHCR's offices around the African continent seem to create and implement their own procedures and policies. In Zimbabwe, the UNHCR will occasionally assist those who flee from the ANC's oppressive human rights policies. The United States was able to assist one such individual, Oyama Mabandla flee to Italy after leaving the ANC. According to the American Embassy in Harare, Mr. Mabandla was "subject to arrst and deportation, with the ANC choosing the destination" and the UNHCR office advised the embassy that "at present, they do not consider anyplace on the African continent as secure".

Although some UNHCR officials admit that any black South African refugee who dissents from the ANC is not safe in Africa, several expressed strong opposition to any proposal to routinely offer black South Africans asylum in the United States, Canada, Australia and Western Europe. Although the numbers of refugees is quite small (approximately 15,000) and they could be easily absorbed by western democracies, the UNHCR officials were opposed because "you would destroy the liberation movements". Although most black South African refugees find themselves living under the jurisdiction of the ANC, a Soviet-backed movement, and find themselves sent to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern Europe for military and other training, their first choice for a country of asylum is the United States of America.

American interests in the protection of human rights for these black South African refugees and our interest in countering the expansion of Soviet influence in Southern Africa are undermined by the current system of assisting black South African refugees. A serious reevaluation of our own refugee admissions policies needs to be undertaken, and

the UNHCR policy decisions we have heretofore tolerated or accepted need dramatic overhaul.

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[1]The State Department's cable asking posts to report information relevant to Section 1223 of PL 100-204 makes clear that no great effort is to be expended on this effort. Posts were instructed "New or extensive research is not required."

[2]To verify the group's recollection of a conversation that took place over a decade ago, I asked UNHCR officials about "Mr. McNamara". It was confirmed that during that period Mr. Dennis McNamara, now Deputy Director of UNHCR's legal division, was employed by the UNHCR office in Swaziland.

[3]"The West", a shortening of The Western Front" is the ANC prison camp in Angola. It is also described as "Number 4" or "Quattro". Other ANC prisons in Angola have been reported at Quibaxe, Viana, Luanda, and Malanje.

[4]As a standard practice, which apparently has the blessing of the UNHCR, the ANC requires black refugees who join the movement after being referred by the UNHCR to adopt a "liberation name" and prohibits them from revealing to anyone their true identity. It is under the "liberation name" that the refugees are then transported, at UNHCR expense, from one country to another in Southern Africa. This practice makes it impossible for families in South Africa to track down their loved ones, and facilitates the detention and execution of political dissidents. The system does not always work, as one escapee noted, because there is often a "home boy" in the camp who one has known since childhood.